Three CVEs against PraisonAI's MCP HTTP transport reach NVD ten weeks after the fix shipped
Three CVE records against PraisonAI, a multi-agent framework whose repository carries roughly 9,000 stars, were published on 2026-08-25: two origin-validation bypasses in its MCP HTTP Stream transport (CVE-2026-55532, 7.6 high, and CVE-2026-55529, 6.9 medium) and unbounded per-initialize session accumulation (CVE-2026-55531, 6.5 medium). All three were fixed in praisonai 4.6.58, released 2026-06-13, ten weeks before the records appeared.
Three CVE records against PraisonAI, a multi-agent framework whose repository carries roughly 9,000 stars, were published on 2026-08-25. All three sit in the framework's MCP HTTP Stream transport, and all three were fixed in praisonai 4.6.58 on 2026-06-13, ten weeks before the records appeared.
Two records describe the same validation defect from different attack
positions. The transport's _validate_origin method checked incoming
Origin headers with request_origin.startswith(allowed), a prefix
match, so an attacker-controlled origin such as
localhost.attacker.com passes a check meant to allow localhost.
CVE-2026-55532 (7.6 high) covers the direct unauthenticated
cross-site request forgery against the MCP HTTP server; CVE-2026-55529
(6.9 medium) covers the browser-mediated variant. String matching
where a parser belongs is a recurring failure shape in these records:
the CKAN SSRF filter bypass
recorded on 2026-08-21 fell to hostname-string comparison in an
outbound filter, and this one falls to prefix comparison on an inbound
Origin header.
The third record, CVE-2026-55531 (6.5 medium), is resource exhaustion:
the mcp_post handler created a new _sessions entry for every
initialize request without calling cleanup or enforcing a session cap,
so an unauthenticated sender could accumulate sessions until memory
ran out. That is the same unbounded-session class as Spring AI's
CVE-2026-59279, recorded
four days earlier against a different framework.
The records themselves carry no exploitation claims. PraisonAI users on versions before 4.6.58 get all three fixes in one upgrade.
How was this verified, and what are the sources?
Published · last verified · confidence 1.00.
- GHSA-pvph-5j39-v8qc / CVE-2026-55532 (GitHub advisory, high, published 2026-08-25) - "Origin-validation bypass (startswith prefix match) enables unauthenticated cross-site request forgery against the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server" - accessed
- CVE-2026-55532 CNA record (GitHub) - _validate_origin uses request_origin.startswith(allowed), so an attacker-controlled origin like localhost.attacker.com satisfies the check; fixed in v4.6.58 - accessed
- GHSA-wj6g-v78p-6fx3 / CVE-2026-55529 (GitHub advisory, medium, published 2026-08-25) - the browser-mediated variant of the same startswith origin bypass - accessed
- GHSA-wv94-5qcp-6m36 / CVE-2026-55531 (GitHub advisory, medium, published 2026-08-25) - the mcp_post handler creates a _sessions entry per initialize request without cleanup or a session cap, allowing unauthenticated memory exhaustion - accessed
- PraisonAI v4.6.58 release, published 2026-06-13 - the fixed version all three records name - accessed